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EU climate policy and AFOLU 
• Overall 2030 level of ambition agreed by European 
Council October 2014 
• Commission ESR proposal July 2016 – sharing of effort in 
NETS across MS plus trading mechanisms 
• Commission LULUCF proposal – integration of LULUCF 
into climate policy 
• AFOLU mitigation pursued through CAP as well as 
flanking environmental policies 
• No specific EU targets for agricultural mitigation in NETS 
• Ultimately, how AFOLU mitigation is pursued will depend 
on MS decisions 
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Special role of AFOLU in climate policy 
• European Council guidance 
• The European Council specifically acknowledged "the 
multiple objectives of the agriculture and land use sector, 
with their lower mitigation potential, and the need to 
ensure coherence between the EU's food security and 
climate change objectives".  
• It invited the Commission "to examine the best means of 
encouraging the sustainable intensification of food 
production, while optimising the sector's contribution to 
greenhouse gas mitigation and sequestration, including 
through afforestation".  
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Setting the 2030 framework for agricultural mitigation 
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Reference Scenarios (2013, 
2016) 
European Council conclusions 
2014 
EU 2030 targets for ETS and 
NETS sectors 
Identifies ‘distance to target’ 
between ‘BAU with measures’ 
and 2030 targets 
Proposal for Effort Sharing 
Regulation 2016 
Establishes national NETS 
targets based on equity, 
modified  to achieve greater  
cost effectiveness 
Proposal LULUCF Regulation 
2016 
Permits capped flexibility to 
offset national NETS emissions 
to take account of difficulties in 
mitigating agric emissions 
Member State actions to 
achieve NETS targets 
Common Agricultural Policy 
climate goals 
Importance of agric emissions in 
NETS emissions 
Toolkit to incentivise 
agricultural/LULUCF  mitigation S
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National design of specific policy instruments to reduce agricultural emissions 
Impact assessment 
ESR/LULUCF Regulations 
Modelled cost-effective agric 
mitigation by Member State 
Three (four) topics 
 
• The role played by agriculture and land use (AFOLU) 
sectors in the setting of Member State ESR targets 
• The LULUCF policy architecture 
• The difficulty of agricultural mitigation 
• Adapting the CAP to incentivise agricultural mitigation 
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ROLE OF AFOLU SECTOR IN 
SETTING EFFORT-SHARING 
TARGETS 
6 
The 2014 Framework impact assessment (IA)  
 
• Underpinned the EUCO decision-making on overall 2030 
target, split between ETS and NETS sectors, targets for 
energy efficiency 
• Based on Reference Scenario 2013 
• in the IA agricultural non-CO2 emissions In EUCO option 
eventually adopted were expected to reduce by 28% 
compared to 4% in the 2013 Reference Scenario 
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The 2016 ESR impact assessment.  
• Designed to assess the burden-sharing among Member States 
of the EUCO targets  
• two policy scenarios EUCO27 and EUCO30 
• Based on Reference Scenario 2016 to establish baseline 
• Little change in reduction of agricultural emissions in Reference 
Scenario (-2.4% compared to -4% in 2013 RS) 
• But very different outcomes in the policy scenarios. 
• Non-CO2 mitigation based on carbon values of €0.05/t in 
EUCO27 and zero in EUCO30 
• Correspondingly, minimal or no reduction of agricultural 
emissions expected in 2030 policy scenarios 
• Was potential for agricultural mitigation overlooked because of 
fears over reduced activity levels? 
• Does this matter? 
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Explaining NETS effort sharing in the 2016 ESR 
Initial distribution based 
on ‘fairness’, GDP per 
capita 
Adjusted for MS with 
above-average GDPpc 
using gap analysis with 
cost-effective shares 
Two further flexibilities 
- once-off ETS to NETS 
allocation 
- LULUCF credits 
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Gap in 2030 between GDP-based targets and cost-
effective EU emission reductions for high income 
Member States (as % of 2005 emissions)  
10 
Source: Commission ESR Impact Assessment 2016 
Implications of treatment of non-CO2 emissions 
in EUCO27/30 modelling for MS targets 
• MS targets based initially on ‘fairness’ – relative GDP per 
capita – between 0% and 40% 
• For high-income MS, targets adjusted for cost-
effectiveness based on ‘gap analysis’ with cost-effective 
targets derived from the policy scenarios 
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Implications of treatment of non-CO2 emissions 
in EUCO27/30 modelling for MS targets 
• Adjustment solution (option T2) was to arbitrarily 
redistribute targets among the high-income countries 
• An upward adjustment in ambition of 1 percentage point for group 
1, no adjustments for group 2 and a downward adjustment in 
ambition of 3 percentage points for group 3 and 9 percentage 
points for group 4.  
• Recall, EUCO scenarios effectively ignore potential for 
non-CO2 emission reductions beyond ‘business as usual’ 
• High-income countries with high shares of non-CO2 
emissions in NETS will, by construction, have large cost-
effectiveness ‘gap’ as calculated in scenarios 
• Hence, adjustment for cost-effectiveness de facto 
weighted towards countries with high shares of 
agricultural emissions 
 
12 
Implications of being an ‘agricultural’ emitter for 
outcome of the ‘gap’ analysis 
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Group 1:   
DE, UK and FR, the group with a low gap 
below or around 5% across all scenarios.  
Group 2: 
SE and FI, a group with a low gap below 
5% across the EUCO27, EUCO30 and 
WEM-EXTRA scenarios, but clearly a 
significantly higher gap in scenarios 
based on the 2013 Reference.  
Group 3: 
A group of small rich Member States 
ranging above the average gap of higher 
income Member States and below 15% 
across most scenarios (AT, DK, BE, NL).  
Group 4: 
A small group with a very high gap of 
above 15% across all scenarios, 
comprising two smaller Member States 
(LU, IE).  
 
Once-off ETS to NETS flexibility 
• Introduced for MS with national emission reduction targets 
significantly above both the EU average target and their 
cost effective reduction potential, as well as for member 
states that did not have free allocation for industrial 
installations in 2013.  
• Allows eligible MS to facilitate the achievement of their 
NETS obligations through the cancellation of EU ETS 
allowances.  
• Once-off flexibility for the commitment period as a whole 
which must be chosen prior to the beginning of the period.  
• Not free – MS making use of this option would forego the 
associated auction revenue.  
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LULUCF flexibility 
• Allows for limited use of net removals from certain 
LULUCF accounting categories, while ensuring no debits 
occur in the LULUCF sectors, to account for MS 
compliance towards NETS targets if needed. 
• The overall amount of LULUCF credits that can be used 
to offset NETS emissions is capped at 280 Mt CO2-eq 
(credits from forest management FM cannot be used)  
• Total allocated across MS based on the relative share of 
agricultural non-CO2 emissions in total NETS emissions 
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Assessing member state’s NETS challenge 
• 2030 reduction percentages relative to 2005 are allocated 
mainly on the basis of GDP per capita. But national GHG 
emissions evolve very differently in the Reference 
Scenario 
• In the 2016 Reference Scenario, NETS emissions 
projected to decrease by around 24% below 2005 levels 
in 2030, ‘distance from target’  is 6%.  
• Challenges are very different for individual member states  
• Disparate picture if countries are ranked on the basis of 
‘distance to target’ in 2030 rather than on the basis of the 
reduction percentages between 2005 and 2030.  
16 
Assessing member state’s NETS challenge 
17 
Reductions in 
Reference Scenario 
‘Distance to target’ 
2005 2030 
Mt CO2-eq 
NETS reduction 
target 
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Assessing member state’s NETS challenge 
relative to Reference Scenario 2016 
• Group 1 
• countries which are likely to have surplus AEAs in 2030. Their expected 
NETS emissions will be below their ESR targets. These are mainly 
Central and East European countries but also include three 
Mediterranean countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
• Group 2 
• countries where the distance to target falls within a 10% range and thus 
will require some additional effort, ranging from UK (4.3% above target in 
2030 in the Reference Scenario) and Italy (9.8% above target).  
• Group 3 
• countries where the distance to target is greater than 10% and significant 
additional efforts will be required over the next commitment period 
• Group 3A  Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium and Germany, share of NETS 
emissions coming from agriculture is relatively low in 2030, less than 
20%.  
• Group 3B Denmark, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, shares of 
agricultural emissions greater than 20% of total NETS emissions in 2030.  
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Member States 2030 challenges - caveats 
• The ‘distances to target’ have been calculated assuming 
full use of permitted flexibilities.  
• The 2016 Reference Scenario assumes full and 
successful implementation of all existing policy measures. 
• The 2016 Reference Scenario based on model runs 
carried out for the Commission differs from MS projected 
NETS emissions in 2030 (see next slide) 
• No carryover of surplus AEAs from the 2013-2020 
commitment period into the 2021-2030 period 
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Member states 2030 challenges –  
impact of Reference Scenario baseline 
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Member States are more pessimistic than Commission regarding emissions 
reductions to 2030 in baseline scenario 
Implications of EU bubble 
• Commission has put in place trading mechanisms in 
NETS sectors to ensure least-cost fulfilment of overall EU 
targets 
• Challenge of MS ESR targets also depends on use MS 
make of trading mechanisms 
• MS have not to date made use of these mechanisms and 
prefer to meet targets domestically 
• A number of MS have domestic targets in addition to EU 
targets  
• ESR IA looked at adding central information site, central 
market place for AEA transfers or mandatory auctioning 
• Links with annual monitoring and 5-year legal compliance 
checks (2027 and 2032) 
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Brexit implications 
• EU and some MS have now ratified Paris Agreement 
• Joint action covering the emission level allocated to each Party 
remains to be communicated to  Secretariat  
• Following Brexit UK will need to decide how it wishes to 
meet its own statutory climate targets 
• UK has promised to ratify Paris by end of this year and 
will do so as EU member. Joint fulfilment of EU pledge?  
• Regarding ETS, could set up its own ETS and link with 
the EU (a la Swiss) or agree to remain in ETS (a la 
Norway and Iceland) 
• Will UK remain part of NETS? Will targets have to be 
renegotiated? Norway indicated it intends to participate in 
NETS (with indicative target 40% reduction) 
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ASSESSMENT OF LULUCF 
INTEGRATION 
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European Council guidance on LULUCF 
 
• “Policy on how to include Land Use, Land Use Change 
and Forestry into the 2030 greenhouse gas mitigation 
framework will be established as soon as technical 
conditions allow and in any case before 2020”. 
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LULUCF policy architecture 
• Three options in Commission 2030 Communication 
• Option 1 — LULUCF pillar: Maintain non-CO2 
agriculture sector emissions in a potential future Effort 
Sharing Decision, and further develop a LULUCF sector 
policy approach separately; 
• Option 2 — Land use sector pillar: Merging the 
LULUCF and agriculture sector non-CO2 emissions into 
one new and independent pillar of the EU’s climate policy; 
• Option 3 — Effort Sharing: Include the LULUCF sector 
in a potential future Effort Sharing Decision. 
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LULUCF policy architecture 
• Responses to public consultation very mixed 
• half of respondents had no clear preference 
• one third of respondents, mostly environmental NGOs and forestry 
organisations, were in favour of keeping LULUCF as a separate pillar  
• option of merging agriculture and LULUCF in a separate pillar outside 
the ESD received the least support  
• Stand-alone LULUCF pillar with two-way flexibility. 
• NETS credits must be used to maintain ‘no debit’ status if necessary 
• Capped but differentiated possibilities for MS to use LULUCF net 
credits to offset NETS emissions 
• Limited flexibility with NETS justified “on the need derived from the 
agriculture sector share for each Member State in the ESD” and as 
providing “additional incentives to improve and optimize the mitigation 
potential from LULUCF”   
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LULUCF flexibility and environmental integrity 
• Some NGOs opposed in principle to allowing LULUCF credits 
to be used to offset NETS emissions 
• Position not supported by the Paris Agreement Article 4  
• sets out objective “to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
the second half of this century,….” 
• Others object in practice that LULUCF flexibility weakens 2030 
target (by max ~0.5% overall (39.5% instead of 40%), max 1% 
in NETS (29% instead of 30%)) 
• EUCO decision was a binding target of “at least a 40 % 
domestic reduction in economy-wide greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990” 
• Better to argue to increase level of ambition at future 
stocktakes than to reject principle of substitution 
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LULUCF flexibility linked to conditions 
• Overall LULUCF balance cannot be in debit (with restrictions on the 
use of Forest Management (FM) credits to achieve balance).  
• LULUCF credits can be traded 
• FM credits cannot be used for LULUCF transfers which can only 
come from additional effort in afforestation (AF) and cropland and 
grassland management.   
• Overall amount of LULUCF transfers is capped (whether the level of 
the cap is appropriate can also be debated).  
• LULUCF credits enter NETS to the extent that a MS needs them to 
achieve their own ESR target, but not beyond that  
• i.e. cannot be used to allow MS to generate a surplus to trade with other MS, 
though LULUCF credits can be banked within a period. 
• MS can only make use of LULUCF credits when it meets the technical 
conditions for accurate reporting of LULUCF emissions. 
• Generating additional LULUCF credits will not be costless, at least for 
some MS 
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Allocation of LULUCF flexibility across MS 
• Allocation across MS done on a banded basis, grouping 
MS into bands based on their dependence on agricultural 
emissions in NETS. However, all countries  can make use 
of some transfers.  
• No obligation to make use of these transfers. They are 
ceilings, dependent on MS efforts in the LULUCF sector, 
and not automatic deductions from a country’s NETS 
target.  
• Thus we cannot know if indeed the full transfer permitted 
will be taken up by 2030. Here the Commission points to 
the importance of the interactions with other elements and 
flexibilities in the ESR decision.  
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Final LULUCF reflections 
• Most mitigation potential is in FM but this is also most 
open to gaming e.g. setting FM reference levels 
• Forest-rich countries want maximum scope for FM credits 
• NGOs concerned that treating all LULUCF credits equally 
will encourage afforestation  which can have adverse 
effects for biodiversity etc. 
• Commission proposal creatively links LULUCF flexibility 
with difficulties in agricultural mitigation 
• My sense is that Commission proposal strikes a good 
balance between competing objectives 
• Will it survive the co-decision process? What will be the 
crunch points? 
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IS AGRICULTURAL 
MITIGATION MORE 
DIFFICULT? 
32 
33 
Estimates of agricultural mitigation potential are 
all over the place 
 
 
• Even when narrowing the analysis down to the sole 
emissions of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
from agriculture, a quick overview of the available results 
reveals a wide range of abatement rate estimates in the 
literature. For a commonly used price of 20€/tCO2eq, the 
predicted abatement rates may vary by a factor up to 20 
from one study to another” (Vermont and De Cara, 2010). 
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Implied mitigation potential in EU models 
35 
EcAMPA 2 mitigation potential 
36 
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Source:  Pérez Domínguez and Fellmann, Eurochoices, 2015 
Agricultural mitigation potential 
• It is hard to make a direct comparison with the cost of 
abatement in the ETS or other NETS sectors because 
information on the implied carbon values of meeting the 
European Council targets in the ETS and NETS sectors is not 
given.  
• The Reference Scenario 2016 shows a shortfall of 6% in 
relation to the 2030 target of a 30% reduction in emissions 
relative to 2005  
• Assuming this shortfall could be eliminated by raising the price 
of carbon emitted in the NETS sector to €30-35/tonne, it would 
seem that agriculture could make a proportionate contribution 
to this reduction. 
• Political constraint if mitigation occurs through changes in 
activity levels rather than through changes in technology? 
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Abatement costs in CAPRI? 
• Measured as the carbon price which achieves the 
specified target reductions in emissions 
• Distinction between private (costs to farmers) and 
economic (costs to society) costs 
• Loss in economic welfare for marginal reduction in 
emissions is arguably the relevant policy indicator 
• CAPRI shows increase in economic welfare with reduced 
emissions as increase in producer welfare exceeds 
consumer losses 
• Agricultural production in CAPRI valued at market prices 
(i.e. including impact of border protection) overstates 
social value of maintaining, e.g. beef production. On the 
other hand, market prices do not reflect co-benefits or 
external costs of agricultural production 
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HOW TO INCENTIVISE 
AGRICULTURAL MITIGATION 
(WITH FOCUS ON THE CAP) 
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Making CAP more climate efficient 
• “The CAP is already playing a crucially important role in 
combatting the effects of climate change. This year, some 
€16.3 billion of the CAP budget will be climate relevant… 
• Hogan, DG AGRI Outlook Conference Dec 2015 
• Measured against carbon reduction achieved, my 
suspicion would be this is the most expensive abatement 
measure currently in place in the EU 
• Recent inventory exercises (Frelih-Larsen et al 2015; 
Ricardo-AEA 2016) make clear the relatively limited 
mitigation options which can be supported by the CAP 
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Incentivising research 
 
• We lack cost-effective supply-side options to reduce 
emissions from agricultural production 
• Will the patchwork of varying national incentives to 
address agricultural emissions under the ESR give the 
necessary drive to undertake the necessary research? 
• Projects like MACSUR are helping to lay the foundation 
but need to focus on mitigation as well as adaptation 
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